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Abstract
This is the first paper that evaluates the effects of a reform requiring Russian
universities to make admission decisions based on the results of a national high-
school exam. We show the reform led to a threefold increase in geographic mobility
rates among high-school graduates from small cities and towns to start college. This
is robust to different techniques, samples, and specifications. The reform was also
accompanied by increases in students’ expectations to attend university, parental
transfers, and educational expenditures. There is no evidence the reform affected
parental labor supply, divorce, and employment outcomes of graduates who did not
move.
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In 2009, Russia introduced a reform that changed the admission process for all universities
in the country.1 Before 2009, admission decisions were based on college-specific entry tests.
The reform instead required higher education institutions to determine their admissions
on the basis of the scores from a nationally administered, secondary-school examination,
known as the Unified State Exam (USE). Ours is the first paper that evaluates the effect
of this reform on a wide range of outcomes, paying special attention to student geographic
mobility to pursue studies in post-secondary education.
Many countries use decentralized college admission policies that require applicants to take
institution-specific entrance exams, e.g., Japan, Finland, Israel, and until recently South
Korea and Brazil (Avery, Roth, and Lee, 2014; Pekkala Kerr et al., 2015). Such exams
create substantial frictions, imposing large application costs to students and preventing
them from applying to more than a small number of universities.2 In the US, university
candidates often have to complete college-specific requirements, such as admission essays in
addition to taking SAT tests, quite often more than once (Goodman, Gurantz and Smith,
2018). This is in contrast with countries where the application and admission processes
are centralized with national exams as the main criterion for admissions (such as China,
Taiwan, Italy, Belgium, Norway, and Germany).3 Although the welfare and sorting effects
of university-specific versus national university entrance exams have been investigated from
a theoretical perspective (e.g., Chade, Lewis, and Smith, 2014; Che and Koh, 2016; Hafalir
et al., 2018), there is little empirical evidence on their effects on student decisions. The
enactment of the USE reform in Russia therefore provides a fascinating opportunity for
studying the effects of college application costs on student geographic mobility and parental
behavior.
Knowledge about higher education in post-Soviet Russia is limited by data availability,
1Throughout the paper, we use the terms “university”, “college”, “higher education institution”, and
“post-secondary education institution” interchangeably.
2For instance, Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014) report that high application costs limit the number of
applications sent by the median student in the United States to three.
3National exams are used in several other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and most of Western














something we also have to face in our empirical work.4 Most of what we currently know
comes from correlational studies by sociologists and educationalists.5 A consistent message
stemming from that strand of research is that, before the 2009 reform, university access was
highly unequal. Students from low socioeconomic status (SES) were considerably less likely
to apply to college and gain a degree than their high SES peers. For instance, data from
the 2006 Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) reveal that about 65% of 25–29
year old individuals reported to have a university qualification if their father also had a
university degree, as opposed to only 20% among those whose fathers had no qualification.6
The substantial and statistically significant differential of 45 percentage points is twice as
large as the college participation gap observed in the United States between children from
high- and low-income families in the last forty years (e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2002;
Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson, 2009), and it is comparable to the US black-white male
college graduation rate differentials observed in the 1960s (Neal, 2006).
Another important dimension of the large college achievement gap in pre-reform Russia
was associated with the geographic origin of university graduates. Before 2009, less than
20% of young Russians were born in the ten largest cities (including Moscow and St. Peters-
burg) and yet they represented more than 60% of all university graduates, whereas only one
in ten graduates were born in small cities, towns, and rural areas, which instead accounted
for about half of the population. This over-representation of high school graduates from
large cities among university students was associated with a steep socioeconomic gradient.
Households from small cities and other peripheral areas had a total income that was on
average 40–50% lower than the total income for households living in major cities, even after
adjusting for differences in family size and the cost of living across locations. This slant
of our analysis ties in well with the large literature that has emphasized the importance of
geographic mobility to economic welfare and the functioning of the family. For example,
4For instance, there are no publicly available university data on the student population and institution-
specific inputs nor is there any available information on department-institution-specific declared and ef-
fective entry USE tariffs. This means we cannot look at university application and enrollment decisions
based on the USE results. In addition, individual information on university application, enrollment, and
attendance decisions is also not consistently collected over time in standard surveys. This poses some
constraint on our analysis.
5See, among others, Johnson (2010) and Ampilogov, Prakhov, and Yudkevich (2013).
6These statistics are in line with those recently found by Borisov and Pissarides (2016). The RLMS













using Norwegian registry data, Løken, Lommerud, and Lundberg (2013) document a rela-
tively low mobility of married men without a college degree, especially in rural areas (see
also Konrad et al., 2002; Rainer and Siedler, 2009).
Proponents of the USE reform argued that college application costs would have been con-
siderably reduced, especially for students living in peripheral areas far from the main urban
centers where elite universities were (and still are) located.7 This was because a USE-based
admission would have spared applicants from preparing for college- or department-specific
entry exams and from taking such exams in each of the different programs chosen. The pre-
reform costs materialized in terms of time and money, as they included preparation time (in
addition to the time devoted to standard school tests), expenses on preparatory materials,
books and tutors, as well as transportation times and fares, and temporary relocation rents
while sitting for the exams. Other potential costs faced by applicants in the pre-reform
period were related to favoritism and corruption, which could have penalized students from
peripheral areas more than those from larger cities, in part because the latter and their
families had better knowledge of (and more direct access to) the admission system and its
administrators. The USE reform would have not only abated such costly frictions consider-
ably, but also allowed simultaneous applications to multiple colleges/programs, something
that was highly impractical in the pre-reform regime. The expectation then was that a
large share of the benefits would have gone to high school graduates from areas of Rus-
sia which did not have physical proximity to post-secondary education institutions. This
background motivates the primary focus of our analysis on student geographic mobility.
The USE reform, therefore, intended to democratize access to higher education for a large
group of young people. In this sense one might expect that the reform would induce changes
similar to those observed after the expansion of college availability in the United States
over the course of the twentieth century, although Russia has long been one of the countries
with the largest share of the adult population holding university-level qualifications (OECD,
various years). As several influential studies show, greater college availability does increase
access to higher education and pushes up college enrollment rates in the US (e.g., Card,














1995; Goldin and Katz, 1999; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Black and Sokoloff, 2006).8 But so
far there is no available evidence on the experience faced by high school students in Russia.
This is where we make our first contribution.
In order to investigate the effect of the reform on student geographic mobility, we look
at several, different (but related) pieces of evidence. First, we analyze mobility from the
perspective of the household of origin using panel data from the RLMS covering the period
from 1994 to 2014. We contrast the probabilities of leaving the parents’ home for students in
their last year of high school, who were treated by the USE reform, with those of children in
a similar age range who are not in the last year of high school. We show that the exit rates of
the former group sharply increased right after the reform, while the mobility behavior of the
latter group remained unaltered. This result is robust to choosing alternative comparison
groups. For instance, students in the last year of vocational or technical school, who do
not take USE tests at the end of their studies, did not experience any significant change in
their exit rates. Additional checks, such as using a propensity score matching technique in
order to re-weight the control group or including household fixed effects (comparing treated
and untreated siblings) does not affect this result.
We also show that the effect of the reform on geographic mobility is only present in loca-
tions that lack large higher education institutions. Specifically, our difference-in-difference
estimates indicate that the fraction of high school graduates in small Russian cities and
towns who left their parental home after graduation went up by at least 12 percentage
points as a direct response to the USE reform, a three-fold increase with respect to the
mobility rate before 2009. Interestingly, we do not find any significant impact on mobility
among students who live in rural areas, in part because of the relatively low quality of
secondary schools in rural locations.
Second, we exploit the fact that the USE reform was not expected to affect high school
students in Moscow and St. Petersburg as an independent natural experiment. Difference-
in-difference estimates using this alternative control group yield results that are fully con-
sistent with our findings from the earlier experiments. Finally, we repeat our exercise using
8Blanden and Machin (2004) and Winter-Ebmer and Wirz (2002) find a comparable relationship between
access and enrollment for Britain and Europe, respectively. This phenomenon is widespread. Schofer and














a different measure of mobility that specifically focuses on changes in residence location for
the purpose of starting university studies. This alternative data source allows us to control
for a full set of characteristics related to the location and quality of the higher education
institution, as well as for the field of study. Depending on the specification, we find that,
post-reform, college students who entered university right after high school are 8 to 12
percentage points more likely to have come from a location other than the city where their
university is based.9
Among the possible mechanisms at work behind these results, having highly educated
parents and having knowledge of the reform are likely to have played an important role. The
latter channel is proxied by college attendance intentions, for which we find a substantial
increase exactly among the high school graduates who eventually move after the reform, i.e.,
only those from small cities and towns. We also investigate the effect of geographic distance
to regional centers (where large universities are located). While we find no significant
interaction with distance for students in small cities and towns, there seems to have been
an increase in mobility in rural locations that are very distant from regional centers.
The estimated effect of the USE reform on geographic mobility are sizeable, corresponding
to at least 60% of the out-of-state migration rates observed in recent years among college
students in the United States (Kennan, 2015) and accounting for about one-fifth of the
overall interregional migration rate in Russia in the years since the reform (Guriev and
Vakulenko, 2015). We take this result as a strong indication that the USE reform has
played a key role in facilitating access to higher education institutions for less advantaged
young people who would have not normally enrolled into university programs in Russia.10
Our second contribution is to explore whether the USE reform led to unanticipated conse-
quences in other life domains. This deepens our understanding of the potential mechanisms
that lie behind the estimated mobility patterns. We find that the increase in student mo-
bility associated with college enrollment was accompanied by a 40–50% increase in the
likelihood of financial transfers from parents to children around the time of the migration
9Another piece of descriptive evidence comes from available aggregate data on internal migration. We
briefly discuss these data below.
10This result is relevant also to debate about the impact that education has on the type of mobility that
modern labor markets need to operate efficiently. See Machin, Salvanes, and Pelkonen (2012), although













decision and a 70% increase in the share of household educational expenditures in the
last year of the child’s high school. This reveals significant child investments made by a
nonneglible fraction of forward-looking parents in peripheral small cities and towns, who
would have not invested in the absence of the reform. Although largely unanticipated in
the policy discussions that preceded the reform, this is arguably not an undesirable change.
Importantly, we find no evidence that the reform led to unintended changes in parental
behavior with possibly negative spillovers. In particular, we find no effect of the reform on
mother’s and father’s labor supply (both at the extensive and intensive margins), on major
categories of household consumption, and on parental divorce. We also find no evidence of
unfavorable labor market outcomes among young adults who did not move after completing
their secondary education.
A USE-like reform is quite unique in the recent experience of advanced economies.11
By dramatically reducing college entry costs, the policy made access to higher education
more democratic and easier for all students, especially those from the less advantaged
Russian periphery. This is interesting in view of the discussions based on the growing body
of evidence according to which college application and enrollment decisions fall short of
expectations among low-income students in a number of countries, including the United
States (see, for instance, Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Hoxby and Turner, 2015; Dillon and
Smith, 2017) and Britain (e.g., Crawford, Macmillan, and Vignoles, 2017; Crawford et al.,
2017).
The next section describes the institutional background against which the USE reform
took place. In Section 3 we develop a simple conceptual framework which guides the
interpretation of our empirical findings. Section 4 describes the data and methods used to
analyze the leaving home decision among high school graduates, presents the difference-in-
difference estimates using alternative control groups, a number of robustness checks and
the role of heterogeneity, as well as evidence on the possible mechanisms behind our results
(i.e., distance, socioeconomic background, and information). Section 5 presents difference-
11Most of the existing literature focuses on different sources of variation in educational supply (not
necessarily affecting the post-secondary education sector directly), such as changes in compulsory schooling
laws, the minimum school-leaving age, tuition costs, and geographic proximity of schools. See, among
others, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004), Kane (2006), Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009), and Black,













in-difference estimates based on the alternative measure of mobility. Section 6 explores
other outcomes, and Section 7 concludes. Supplementary material on the institutional
background, data, and additional results discussed throughout the paper are available in
the Online Appendix.
2. Institutional Background and the USE Reform
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly formed Russian Federation witnessed
a rapid dismantling of the preexisting higher education system. The new environment gave
universities an increasing degree of autonomy with respect to the central government.12
Taking advantage of this opportunity, some universities — including many new private
institutions — committed resources to high quality educational provision. Others remained
bureaucratic and hierarchical. Reflecting this marked diversity in provision and quality,
admission procedures were equally highly heterogeneous. Most institutions developed their
own entry tests, which were administered and graded in-house, and tests often required a
face-to-face oral examination assessed by an internal committee.
Keeping in mind the high concentration of post-secondary education institutions in a few
large cities, one clear disadvantage of this fragmented admission system is that potential
applicants had to face hefty frictions in pursuing an application. Because entry tests had
to be taken in person, students living far from (high-quality) universities had first to incur
the cost of travelling to examination venues and the cost of living arrangements in Moscow
or St. Petersburg for up to one month. Such costs varied, depending on the applicants’
geographic origin. For instance, only the transportation cost were between $500 and $700
on average, representing between 30% and 40% of the pre-reform mean monthly income.
They would have been higher for those coming from relatively far away locations, who on
average would also have had lower incomes.
In addition, the new post-Soviet system provided abundant opportunities for favoritism
(e.g., some insider candidates with connections had preferential access to preparation ma-
terials) and corruption (e.g., teaching preparatory courses for admission was known to be a
12For an overview of changes in, and the evolution of, the educational landscape in Russia over the last
thirty years, see Johnson (2010); Lukyanova (2012); Belskaya and Sabirianova Peter (2014), and Denisova-













nontrivial source of additional income for university faculty members involved in the pro-
cess). The former minister of education, Vladimir Filippov, in an interview given in 2003,
admitted that one of the goals of then planned USE reform was to eradicate the corruption
associated with university admissions. The mean size of the bribe for admission to top
Moscow universities prior to the reform was estimated to be around $10,000, more than
half of the pre-reform yearly average per capita income.13 Although universities could have
waived tuition fees for gifted students, connections and bribery were allegedly widely used
also to have access to such state-funded places exempt from tuition fees (Osipian, 2009). If
fees were not waived, they had to be paid, and these could have been substantial depending
on the program or the college, with some universities requiring around $10,000 per year for
a four-year program.
An inevitable consequence of the high travel costs, the substantial costs associated with
admission exam preparation (in terms of time and money), and the large bribes is that
committing to one university (or even one specific program) would have made it impossi-
ble for periphery candidates to apply to other programs. Attending the most prestigious
universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg was therefore considered outside the feasible
opportunity set for anyone except selected few with connections, considerable financial
resources, or exceptional talent.
The admission reform based on the Unified State Exam (USE) is the centerpiece of a
strategy to upend the pre-existing higher education system. The USE consists of a series
of tests taken by all students in Russian secondary schools at the end of their final year.14
Although students can choose which tests to take out of 14 different subjects, Russian
language and Math exams are mandatory for graduation.15
The USE reform was introduced in 2009. Starting from the 2009/10 academic year,
university admission decisions have to be based exclusively on USE passing scores.16 Each
13The source for the monetary amount of the bribe is from RIA Novosti, 26 August 2011 (see
<https://ria.ru/20110826/424566241.html>).
14Since 2007, mandatory education in Russia covers grade 1 (ages 6 and 7) through grade 11. Schooling
is split into primary (grades 1–4), middle (grades 5–9) and senior (grades 10–11) classes. The USE is taken
by the end of the eleventh grade typically by 15–18 years old students.
15USEs are not required for students pursuing a vocational/technical track, which usually begins after
completion of the ninth grade and extends over 2–4 additional years of study.
16There are some exceptions to this rule. For example, there are contests (known as “Olympiads”)













program within a higher education institution must publicize the subject tests (which
are typically one or two besides Math and Russian) and the minimum threshold scores
needed for admission. Although different university programs in the same field of study
typically require the same subject tests, they set different thresholds, with better programs
normally requiring higher scores. This information is made available to all high schools
well before their students sit for each test. Final-year high-school students therefore know
which subject tests and threshold scores are needed to apply to any program in the country.
There are no reasons for students to take and pass subject tests besides Russian and Math,
other than university access. For instance, there is no evidence that employers use such
elective tests as a screening devise in hiring.
Only students scoring above the threshold in each of the required subjects can apply to
the program. Applicants are then ranked according to their total score (the simple sum
of scores in the required tests), and the final admission decision is made according to this
ranking, until either all vacancies are filled or the pool of eligible applicants is exhausted,
without any specific coordination among universities.17 After learning their USE scores,
students are allowed to apply simultaneously to up to 15 programs. Specifically, they may
apply to up to five different universities and three programs within each institution. The
USE-based ranking is also used to determine the financial aid students receive from the
state, whereas — before the reform — state funds were allocated to universities which in
turn assigned scholarships based on their own admission criteria.18
program of their choice and offered a full scholarship. The number of university students who are Olympiads
winners has been historically low. Another exception applies to programs requiring specific skills (e.g. fine
arts and journalism) for which USE scores are complemented with additional tests. At the discretion of
universities, students who obtained a secondary school diploma through a technical or vocational school, or
pursuing part-time, long-distance and evening-only programs, and students with disabilities can be given
alternative entry exams. Also these represent a relatively small fraction of university students. Finally,
a “grandfathering” clause allows individuals who graduated from high school before 2009 or who already
possess a Bachelors diploma to be exempted and be admitted to university based on alternative criteria.
All such exceptions cover 25% of university students in each entry cohort since 2009. Most of these students
generally enroll when they are 19 or older in part-time or evening-only programs, while virtually all students
in top institutions enroll at younger ages in regular, full-time programs. This is a feature we will come
back to in Section 5. Since 2016/17 (outside our sample period), admission rules have become stricter and
even more tightly linked to the USE results.
17Unfortunately, there is no institutional access to individual USE scores across higher education insti-
tutions, nor are there official data sources recording where students apply.
18Data on financial aid recipiency are not available at the individual level and thus this margin cannot be
analyzed. Notice however that, although the reform can be viewed as a package of new college admission













Unified State Exams were introduced gradually. The first were piloted in 2001 in few
schools in five of the 84 regions of the Russian Federation. By 2008, USEs were offered
everywhere and essentially all students in the last year of high school sat in at least one
subject test, although only 16% of that cohort of graduates took a test other than Math
and Russian. While some (very few) universities used USE scores as part of their admission
process before 2009, the majority — and notably the largest and most prestigious state
universities in Moscow and Saint Petersburg — kept relying on their own practices.19 It
was only with the college entry cohort of 2009 that the USE scores became the standard
yardstick for university admissions. Since then, the number of elective tests also grew as
more and more programs expanded the number of their required subjects.20
One of the main objectives of the 2009 reform was that university admissions should
rely on students’ performance in the USE. Across the entire country, the tests are taken
at the same time in all secondary schools, drastically reducing the cost of applying to
college for students located in regions far away from major cities. One recurrent theme
surrounding the introduction of the reform in fact has been the exigency of attracting young
talented students from the countryside and peripheral areas to Russia’s top metropolitan
universities, especially in science majors (e.g., Ampilogov, Prakhov, and Yudkevich, 2013).
This is exactly the focus of our paper.21
education sector in general, and to each university in particular, did not change as a result of the reform
(see also the Online Appendix). Allocations of financial aid to individual students also did not change
across and within institutions. We thus do not expect any response to the USE reform driven by changes
in financial aid rules.
19As a result of this, allowing for time as well as regional variation to pick up earlier adoptions of the
USE based admission system cannot identify the impact of the reform.
20Consistent with a strong first-stage effect, the Online Appendix documents a sharp post-2008 increase
in physics tests (required by most programs in engineering and natural sciences) and social studies tests
(required by most social science and humanities programs). It also discusses other issues related to enroll-
ment and funding in greater detail. Here, we just point out that the fraction of overall admissions increased
after the reform, despite the baby bust experienced by Russia at the very beginning of the 1990s.
21Another anticipated role of the reform was that, by moving the admission tests away from higher
education institutions, the USE could eliminate (or greatly reduce) illegitimate practices associated with
the old system. Moreover, the USE was also expected to affect the educational system preceding the entry
into university, not only because student performance would become a readily available indicator on which
to rank high schools, but also because Russian and Math tests would be mandatory requirements for high
school graduation. Despite this, the bar set for the Russian and Math tests has been possibly low, with
only 1% of all high school students failing to pass on the first attempt. Our paper does not test whether














Here we develop a simple conceptual framework to guide the interpretation of our empirical
findings. Since the primary focus of the analysis is to understand whether and how the USE
reform affects the likelihood that high school graduates leave home to enroll into a post-
secondary education program, our setup is based on the work on migration and education
developed by Sjaastad (1962), Becker (1964/2009), and Mountford (1997).22
Suppose a country is composed of two regions. The “core” region is where high-quality
elite universities are located. The other region, which we refer to as the “periphery”, has
no college (or only lower quality institutions). Consider a student living in the periphery
who is about to complete the last year of her high school education. She has to decide
whether to apply to an elite university in the core region. Her objective is to maximize
lifetime earnings, which depend on her ability, a, and her past human capital investments,
x. Attending an elite college is costly. There are preparation costs involving personal time
and effort, tutors, and the necessary materials for taking admission exams. In addition,
since she lives far from the core region, the student has to face costs associated with moving
to and settling in the core region while sitting for the admission exams as well as during
her college studies if her application is successful. The total cost of applying is denoted by
k.
In order to decide whether to apply, she compares the net benefits of both alternatives.
The net benefit of pursuing an application and moving to the core region is given by
f(a, x, k), which is increasing in a and x and decreasing in k. We assume that the net
benefit of not applying to an elite college and staying in the periphery is not affected by
k and is thus given by g(a, x). We also assume that the cost of the effort associated with
applying to an elite college is decreasing in ability, hence the slope of f with respect to a
is steeper than that of g.
This setup is sufficiently general to encompass a variety of cases, including corner solutions
(either all students or none will apply), and multiple equilibria. The case with a unique
interior equilibrium is shown in Figure 1, where the student will find it optimal to apply
22Other related models in the migration literature are discussed in Dustmann and Glitz (2011). See also














and eventually move if her ability is above a∗, whereas if the student has an ability level
lower than a∗ she will stay in the periphery.
Consider now the introduction of a reform that increases the net benefit of applying to
elite colleges, as intended by the USE reform. This can happen either through a reduction
in the costs k or through an increase in the benefits that accrue to those who move. There
are many ways in which such a reform may change the equilibrium shown in Figure 1. We
focus on two possibilities that help us to interpret all the interesting cases we might have
to deal with in the empirical analysis.
Figure 2a shows the first case, in which the net benefit increase is enjoyed by all students
irrespective of ability. As a result, the f curve shifts upward and the new critical level
of ability, a∗∗, is to the left of pre-reform threshold, a∗. Applications to elite universities
and student mobility therefore will unambiguously increase. The second case is depicted
in Figure 2b. Here the net benefit increase is concentrated among students with ability
higher than a∗. This is captured by a slope change in the f curve beyond a∗, rather than
by a level shift across the whole ability distribution (as in Figure 2a). In this case, then,
the original (pre-reform) equilibrium is unaffected and we expect to observe no change in
mobility.
In summary, it is an empirical question whether a reform such as the one described in
Section 2 will lead to an increase in student mobility. If ability is not uniformly distributed
across the periphery, it is possible that the reform would have heterogenous effects. In
particular, if a sub-region or a sub-set of the population in the periphery have ability levels
below a∗∗, then no effect is expected to be found.
4. Leaving Home Among High School Graduates
In this section we assess the impact of the USE reform on the probability that high school
graduates leave their household of origin. If the reform were effective, we expect to observe
a strong positive increase in this likelihood among individuals who just gain a high school
qualification, since these are exactly those who can potentially benefit from the USE tests.
We present difference-in-difference estimates that compare their leaving-home probability













since we expect the mobility response to depend on the local availability of higher education
institutions, we take advantage of the fact that the reform is unlikely to affect the leaving-
home probability among students who live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where elite
institutions are located, as an additional exercise. We perform a number of robustness
checks and test if there is response heterogeneity among specific groups. And we conclude
the section with an analysis of three possible channels through which we observe the results
we find, namely, the roles of geographic distance, parental socioeconomic background, and
information.
4.1 Data and Methods
We use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is a
nationally representative annual household survey based on the first national probability
sample drawn in the Russian Federation.23 We use all the 19 annual rounds available from
1994 to 2014 (except 1997 and 1999 when the survey was not conducted). The RLMS
covers 32 “oblasts” (or states) and 7 federal districts.24
For adult individuals aged 14 years or more who leave their household of origin and cannot
be followed in subsequent waves, we know the reason for leaving, as long as their relatives
are interviewed. Up to the 2008 wave, there are only three possible reasons: (i) move to
a different address; (ii) stay at the same address in a new household; and (iii) death. For
our purposes, leaving home is identified with reason (i). From 2009 onwards, more detailed
reasons are recorded, including one in which an adult household member has moved to
study in another location (the exact place however is not specified). In a later part of the
paper we will use this more detailed information, even if it only covers the post-reform
period.
Our sample consists of young adults who are unpartnered and childless, and co-reside
with at least one carer (parent or grandparent). We refer to our outcome as leaving the
“parental” home, although 4% of the individuals in the sample co-reside with their grand-
parents. The outcome, denoted `ijt, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i moves
23Extensive documentation on the RLMS is available at <www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse>.














out of household j within one year after the interview at time t and 0 if the individual
continues to co-reside with his/her parents. We let dijt be an indicator variable equal to 1
if individual i in household j attends the last year of high school at time t and 0 otherwise,
and s be the time period in which the reform is fully implemented.25
Our first approach, in which we assess the effect of the USE reform on the probability
that high school graduates leave their parental home soon after graduation, is to estimate
the following difference-in-difference (DD) model:
`ijt = ψ(t) + αdijt + βdijt × I(t ≥ s) + X′ijtγ + θj + εijt, (1)
where I(z) is a function indicating that the event z occurs,26 Xijt is a vector of individual
and household characteristics, θj denotes household (sibling) fixed effects which we can
credibly identify as the sample contains a sufficiently large number of households with at
least two siblings in both the treatment and control groups, and εijt is a random error term.
Individuals in the treatment group are in their last year of high school with a typical
age around 17 years. We contrast their behavior with the behavior of other comparable
individuals who are not in their last high school year and are aged 15–19. This is our
baseline control group. We are aware of the sensitivity of choosing a control group in
our analysis given the simultaneous roll-out of the reform across the whole country. For
this reason, we consider three alternative plausible comparison groups. The first is given
by a broader group of individuals aged 15–24, many of whom are already high school
graduates. Another is given by a narrower group of individuals aged 15–19 who are in full-
time education. Both control groups may be problematic as they can be selected on the
endogenous outcome. The last, which is less likely to suffer from this selection issue, is the
subsample of students in their last year of technical or vocational secondary education (and
still living at home), as these institutions do not provide qualifications based on the USEs.
25As mentioned in Section 2, we cannot take advantage of the variation across time and states in the
adoption of the Unified State Exams by high schools, because universities did not determine their admission
criteria based on the USE until 2009. We did look for potential effects on mobility arising from regional
differences in the timing of introduction of the USE and did not find any statistically significant result.
26The USE reform was introduced in the 2009/10 academic year. Because most of the RLMS interviews
are between October and December (and never before October), the first students at risk of leaving their
parental home to enroll at university as a result of the USE reform are those attending the last year of high
school in 2008/09. The reform-on period therefore refers to the years from the 2008 RLMS wave onwards,
while the reform-off period covers all the preceding years. Thus, s = 2009, and the high school students













Since our results are not sensitive to the control group definition, the results obtained
with the first two alternative comparisons are not reported in the text but are available in
Slonimczyk et al. (2017). The results obtained with the last alternative comparison group
instead are shown in a later table. The treatment group comprises between 53 and 166
students in any given wave of interviews over the sample period for a total of 1,727 person-
wave observations. The size of the baseline nontreated group varies between a minimum
of 514 individuals and a maximum of 934 young adults for a total of 11,983 person-wave
observations.
We use two different specifications for ψ(t), which captures time trends. In one we assume
ψ(t) = τt, i.e., we include a fully flexible set of time dummies that are common to treatment
and control groups. In the other specification we have ψ(t) = δ0 + (δ1 + δ2dijt)t + [δ3 +
δ4(t − s)]I(t ≥ s). This specification is very flexible, as it allows not only for different
intercepts (when α 6= 0) but also for different linear trends for individuals in the treatment
and control groups (when δ1 6= δ2). The parameters δ3 and δ4 identify possible shifts in
the intercept and slope of the process generating ` at the time of the reform.27 With both
specifications we thus identify β under the assumption that, other than the introduction
of the USE reform, there are no contemporaneous shocks that affect the relative outcome
of the treatment and control groups. We do not know of any related program that could
have induced such differential responses.28
Figure 3 shows the leaving-home rates for treatment and baseline control groups over
time. Both groups experience similar patterns (albeit different levels) during the pre-
reform period, lending support to the common trend assumption that is invoked when
27For instance, they measure the effects of other non-USE policy changes that occur at s and might
influence the likelihood that high school graduates have to leave their parental home. While we are not
aware of other (federal) educational programs introduced at that time, there might have been local changes
in the education system or the labor market that affected ` for individuals in the treatment and/or the
control group. To the extent that these shocks are common to treatment and control groups, they will be
picked up by our time and geographic controls.
28Other reforms in post-transition Russia include the 2001 flat tax reform and the 2007 maternity
capital policy. Albeit important, neither of such reforms would have affected our treatment and control
groups differently. See Slonimczyk (2012) and Slonimczyk and Yurko (2014). In addition, although Russia
experienced a sharp reduction in the total pool of potential students as a result of the reduced fertility
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this reduction has affected both treatment and control groups in
similar ways. Even if universities might have liked to counter the falling number of students by expanding
their recruitment outside their traditional (urban) markets, this was unlikely to happen without the 2009














29 High school graduates experience the greatest rates of leaving both before
and after the reform. The high rates recorded in the middle of the 1990s up until 2000
are likely to reflect the economic turbulence faced by Russia at that time, although the
destination of high school graduates before then was not just college (see, for instance,
Guriev and Vakulenko, 2015). The reform is followed by a sizeable jump in the probability
of leaving home among high school graduates, increasing from an average of about 5%
in the seven years preceding the reform to more than 12% over the post-reform period.
The more detailed information collected by the RLMS after 2008 confirms that at least
95% of this outflow is attributable to graduates who move out to enroll into a university
program, while only a small fraction of the modest increase in leaving-home rates among
young adults in the control group can be accounted for by individuals attending college.30
Appendix Table A.1 shows the summary statistics of the main explanatory variables by
group, both before (reform-off) and after (reform-on) the USE reform, and the p-value of
a pre-reform balance test. Both treatment and control groups are fairly similar along a
number of characteristics, including household demographics, geographic dispersion across
districts, and indicators of socioeconomic status. About 20–25% of the children in the
sample do not live in an intact household where both parents are present. Irrespective of
treatment or control group, more mothers than fathers have a university degree especially
after the introduction of the reform, possibly capturing the fact that fewer fathers co-
reside with their children. In the reform-on period, a greater fraction of children live with
university educated mothers, reflecting a likely cohort effect on educational attainment.
Approximately one in five young adults live in a family that owns a vacation house (dacha),
and another 6–10% have an extra apartment. This latter fraction has increased between the
period before and the period after the introduction of the reform, as has the car ownership
29It is possible that the group-specific linear time trends pick up not only pre-reform trends across groups,
but also differences in the evolution of the outcome variable after the reform since the mobility response of
treated individuals in Figure 3 continues to rise after 2008 (e.g., Borusyak and Jaravel, 2017). This means
that the inclusion of our group-specific trends may lead to an underestimation of the true treatment effect,
even in the absence of differential pre-reform trends across groups.
30To corroborate this evidence, we also looked at the only data available on (aggregate) official statistics
on internal migration by education attainment and age group. Almost all the growth in the aggregate flows
is accounted for by the group of individuals with complete secondary education, i.e. with the credentials
needed to enroll in a university program. Migration flows among individuals with vocational or incomplete
secondary education instead remained stable throughout the period. See Appendix Figure A.1 and further













rate, suggesting an improvement in the living standards over the period. This was also
accompanied by a substantial fall in transportation costs (both to Moscow and to each
state capital) and a moderate reduction in local youth unemployment rate.31 The average
position in the income distribution has instead changed little over time.
Despite the similarities, we also observe some important differences between groups. For
example, students in the treatment group are younger, although the difference becomes
smaller and insignificant in the post-reform period. A larger fraction of individuals in the
treatment group are women. Treated students are also less likely to be of Russian ethnicity,
and more likely to be in a household with both parents present, to have parents with a
greater level of education, and to own a car. Because of these differences, all such controls
are included in the vector X.
As emphasized in the Introduction and Section 2, one objective of the USE reform was to
encourage high school graduates from peripheral areas to move to prestigious universities,
which by and large are located in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other major cities. Location
therefore is expected to play an important role. In the empirical analysis we distinguish
four areas, which are strongly correlated not only with population size but also with the
availability of university programs. The first includes Moscow, St. Petersburg, and their
metropolitan areas within a 50 Km radius. Across all groups, this category, which has an
average population of about 8.5 million people, covers approximately 10–11% of the sample
and has at least 200 universities and most of the elite colleges in the country. The second
area, which accounts for 27–30% of the sample, refers to all the other major cities and their
surrounding areas within a 20 Km radius.32 The mean population per city within this area
is 700,000 and each city has at least one higher education institution. The third area gathers
individuals who live in small cities and towns, has an average population of approximately
100,000 individuals per location, and covers about one-quarter of the sample. The last
31Using the community survey of the RLMS, transportation costs are measured at the population center
level (177 centers) and deflated with the Consumer Price Index (base=2013). Most of such costs are related
to commuting, which is almost entirely provided for by the state. Besides public subsidies that contain
price hikes, the real price for public transports is gone down together with the reduction in energy prices.
The unemployment rate is computed using the Russian Labor Force Survey on individuals aged 16–25 years
for each participating Oblast, and separately for rural and urban areas. As a result, we have 62 distinct
unemployment rates per period.
32The different radius around such centers as opposed to Moscow and St. Petersburg is due to the













location refers to rural areas, which include smaller towns and villages, with a population
of about 5,000 people per location. A slightly larger fraction of individuals in the treatment
group live in rural areas than their control counterparts. None of the latter two categories
(small cities and towns and rural areas) have universities and thus are often referred to as
the “periphery” in our discussion.
By making high school graduation contingent on passing the USE tests, the reform might
have had an effect on high school graduation rates, and thus on the composition of the
treatment group. For instance, the disincentive to drop out of high school might have gone
up if also employers (and not just universities) resorted to the USE test results to screen
candidates. Using data from the RLMS we find no evidence that the probability of staying
in high school beyond grade 9 has changed as a result of the reform (see also OECD, various
years).
To better assess whether the reform affected the quality of the inflow of students out
of high school along a large set of observable characteristics and further account for the
observed differences found in Table A.1, we perform a two-step propensity score match-
ing (PSM) exercise. This combines the difference-in-difference estimator with a matching
method that pairs each treated individual with a subset of individuals in the nontreated
group who are closest to him/her in observable characteristics. The weights needed in this
procedure are computed using propensity score matching in a first stage,33 while the second
stage is estimated using weighted least squares and a full set of time dummies (Blundell
and Costa Dias, 2009). Anticipating our results, we find no evidence of the potential bias
driven by observable differences between groups.34
33The first stage propensity scores are the predicted probabilities obtained from a logit model where the
outcome variable is d× I(t ≥ s) and the right-hand side variables are all the covariates listed in Table A.1.
We use a kernel matching technique with an Epanechnikov kernel and a 0.05 bandwidth. We experimented
with several other kernel/bandwidth combinations and obtained similar results.
34Another domain that could potentially affect the composition of treatment and control groups is given
by the changing nature of the labor market. One might expect this to be especially important after the
2008 financial crisis and influence young people’s migration decisions (Kennan and Walker, 2011). However,
the labor market figures remained fairly stable in Russia since the middle of the 2000s until the end of the
sample period (Rosstat, various issues), and the impact of the financial crisis on the Russian labor market
appeared to be modest and short lived (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011). In the empirical analysis,















Table 1 shows the estimated impact of the USE reform on the probability of leaving the
parental home, β.35 Columns (i)–(iii) present the results from a linear probability spec-
ification of model (1) in which we impose a fully flexible set of time dummy variables
common to treatment and control groups, while columns (iv)–(vi) present estimates from
specifications that include group-specific time trends.36 Column (vii) reports the propen-
sity score matching estimates obtained with the two-step Blundell-Costa Dias procedure.37
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the
population centre level.38
The first panel of the table reports the estimates found for the full LMS sample. Fo-
cusing on the common trend estimates we find that, irrespective of adding controls and
accounting for fixed effects shared by siblings living in the same household, the rate at
which high school graduates leave their parental home increases significantly by about 4
percentage points after the introduction of the USE reform. This is a large effect, repre-
senting a 55% increase of the leaving-home rate averaged over the entire pre-reform period.
Including group-specific linear trends leads to very similar point estimates, except in col-
umn (vi) when we add sibling FE. But in all such cases the effects are not statistically
significant at conventional levels. This might pick up the fact that there are time trend
differences in the home-leaving rates between treatment and control groups. Or, most
likely, it may reflect the loss of statistical power due to the inclusion of differential trends.
The PSM estimate in column (vii) confirms a significant 4 percentage point increase in the
probability of leaving.39
35The estimates associated with the variables in X are in the Online Appendix.
36The marginal effects from a probit specification are virtually identical to those shown in Table 1 and
are thus not presented.
37In the Online Appendix, we display a figure which compares the PSM-weighted and unweighted leaving-
home rates over the whole period of analysis. The key finding from that comparison (robust to different
kernel types and bandwidth levels) is that the large set of control variables has only a modest impact on
leaving-home rates. As a result, the weighted mobility rates follow closely the unweighted rates.
38Clustering at the state level and two-way clustering by population center and year of interview led to
similar results.
39To assess the potential bias arising from the exclusion of unobservables more precisely, we use the
methodology developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005). To compute the Altonji-Elder-Taber (AET)
statistic we use the treatment effect estimate without controls given in column (i) as the estimated coefficient
from the restricted model (βR) and the effect estimate in column (ii) as the coefficient from the full model
(βF ). The AET statistic
βF













As discussed in Section 2, one of the intended consequences of the USE reform is the sub-
stantial cost reduction in applying to prestigious institutions (located in Moscow, St. Pe-
tersburg, and some of the other major metropolitan centres) for all high school graduates,
but especially for those who live far from the main cities and in peripheral areas. We ex-
pect therefore to find heterogeneous responses depending on where individuals (and their
parents) are located. To assess this, we re-estimate equation (1) restricting the sample to
each of our four locations of interest (Moscow/St. Petersburg, other major cities, small
cities and towns, and rural areas). The corresponding effect estimates are reported in the
next four panels of Table 1.
The estimates indicate that the introduction of the reform did not affect the probability
of moving for high school graduates living in Moscow and St. Petersburg. This is not
surprising given most of the top universities are located in those two cities and students
can choose among more than 200 institutions there. The reform also did not have any
impact on students living in the least populated rural areas (bottom panel). We shall come
back to this result at the end of the subsection.
Instead the USE reform had some positive effect on young adults living in the major
metropolitan centers other than Moscow and St. Petersburg (see columns (i), (ii), and
(vii)). This effect is quantitatively similar to what we found earlier for the whole sample,
i.e., an increased probability of about 5 percentage points, a four-fold increase with respect
to the pre-reform leaving-home rate of high-school students in major cities. This effect
however loses statistical significance when we account for sibling fixed effects (column (iii))
and group-specific trends (columns (iv)–(vi)).
The largest impact is observed among students who are located in small cities and towns.
They experienced a significant jump of about 12–16 percentage points in the likelihood of
leaving their parental home after the reform, which represents an increase of 3 to 4 times
over the average leaving-home rate among high school students from small cities and towns
in the pre-reform period. This effect emerges regardless of the specification of ψ(t), whether
with respect to the selection on observables to explain away the entire effect of the USE reform on student
mobility. We find large ratios of about 9. This suggests that, to attribute the entire effect of the USE
reform on student mobility to selection, the selection on unobservables would have to be at least 9 times
stronger than the selection on observables, which seems unlikely. The same evidence emerges with the













sibling FE are included or not, and in the case of the PSM model.40
The framework developed in Section 3 provides a straightforward interpretation of why
high school graduates from the periphery (small cities and towns) have the greatest demand
for college enrollment. Russian towns and small cities do not have major higher education
institutions. In the pre-reform regime, most students in such locations could hope to
gain a college education only if they were willing to bear the high costs associated with the
admission process, i.e., collecting the appropriate preparatory material, attending expensive
pre-sessional modules in-situ and away from home, and taking and passing the admission
test in one specific program. Repeating the whole process for another program would have
been prohibitive in terms of both time and financial resources. Imposing the USE test
results as the default criterion for college admission essentially eliminated most of such
costs. Consistent with the story behind Figure 2a, if the USE reform generates a net
benefit increase for all town-based students, the f(·) curve shifts upward, implying that
applications to (top) university programs and student mobility go up.
Of course, college admission and consequent mobility can only occur if the USE test
results are sufficiently good. Using RLMS data that are available only over the post-reform
period, the estimates reported in the Online Appendix show that high school graduates
from small cities and towns have among the best USE scores in the country, second only
to those achieved by students in Moscow and St. Petersburg.41 Conversely, students from
rural areas have the lowest average scores. If this held true also before the reform, it could
explain why we do not find an effect on the leaving-home probability among high school
graduates from rural areas, although their incentive to attend top college programs should
be similar to that of town-based students. The quality of secondary schools in rural areas
is likely to be deficient to equip their pupils with the adequate skills to enter elite (core)
programs.42
40In addition, the AET statistics indicate that the selection on unobservables should be at least 30 times
larger than the selection on observables in order to attribute the whole effect of the reform to selection
itself. Arguably, this is implausible.
41We are not aware of data on school quality before the reform. In part this is because there was no
agreed-upon, unified measure. At that point, in fact, each school had its own exam, and results were not
recorded in any form. Despite the lack of data, quality is likely to be persistent over time.
42Evidence on USE scores by location is presented in the Online Appendix, together with pre-reform
mobility rates. Interestingly, the leaving-home rates from rural areas were already relatively high even













It is also worthwhile noting that families in small cities and towns are on average poorer
than families living in major cities and particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. By
inducing a greater fraction of (poorer) students from small cities and towns to enroll into
university programs than what would have happened otherwise, the USE reform was suc-
cessful in promoting greater mobility from the bottom of the parental income distribution.
It is however too early to see whether this greater geographic mobility translates into greater
social mobility; this is left for future research. But this sort of geographic mobility is an
important stepping stone to the achievement of greater social equality.
4.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity
A. Sensitivity Checks
In what follows we present further results from three exercises to check the robustness of the
estimates shown in Table 1. The first shows the estimates obtained when the control group
is restricted to students who live at home while they are in their last year of technical or
vocational secondary education. Such institutions typically do not provide qualifications
based on the USE. As anticipated in subsection 4.1, the results which are presented in
the first two columns of Table 2 confirm our baseline estimates with the strongest impact
of the USE reform being concentrated in small cities and towns (although the estimates
in column (ii) are not statistically significant at conventional levels). According to the
estimates in Table 2, high school graduates from such locations faced an increase in excess
of 10 percentage points in the likelihood of leaving their parental home after the reform.
The second exercise consists of a falsification test, which takes advantage of the long
time span covered by the RLMS data. We impose a placebo reform in 2002 and exclude
the actual post-reform period, which refers to the RLMS waves from 2008 up to 2014.
The results from this analysis are in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 2. Across all four
location domains and irrespective of time trend specification and inclusion of sibling FE,
the treatment effect estimates are not only statistically insignificant but also quantitatively
small. In fact, in the case of small cities and towns, we find negative effects. Similar
already to the left of the corresponding threshold in small cities and towns. Inducing extra mobility in













findings also emerge if we use other years for the placebo reform. Although falsification
tests cannot be definitive, these results provide support to our first identification strategy.
With the third exercise we check whether our benchmark estimates are sensitive to the
potential bias due to the differential exposure to the risk of leaving the parental home
between treated and untreated individuals. The differential exposure might be driven by
sampling design issues (e.g., parents and children observed only once cannot be assigned a
mobility status in our benchmark analysis) or differential attrition bias (e.g., older children
might be more difficult to identify even if they co-reside with their parents). It might
be driven also by selection if, as the 2009 reform increases the mobility rates of high
school graduates, the characteristics of non-movers change, with post-reform stayers being
potentially more negatively selected than pre-reform non-movers. In part, some of this
concern is addressed by checking that pre- versus post-reform non-movers are comparable on
the basis of their observable characteristics. Appendix Table A.1 confirms this, which will
be important also for our analysis of spillover effects among non-movers in subsection 6.5
below. Another way of addressing this issue is to look at different control groups with
slightly different overlaps in age and school involvement. As mentioned already, the results
found with those other control groups are identical to our main estimates. The same
emerges from the estimates in the first two columns of Table 2.
Another, perhaps more comprehensive, way to account for the potentially different right
censoring faced by treated and untreated individuals is to estimate discrete time duration
models, which combine both time varying covariates and flexible specifications of duration
dependence (Jenkins, 1995). Such models also allow us to account nonparametrically for
the variation in age among individuals in their last year of secondary school, due to grade
repetition among low achievers on the one hand and grade skipping among academically
talented students on the other. We perform the analysis on a sample of RLMS young adults
aged 14–25 who are initially observed co-residing with their parents or grandparents.
The marginal effect estimates are shown in columns (v) and (vi) of Table 2. They are
obtained from logit models with the same set of explanatory variables used before. Standard
errors are clustered at the population center level and are computed using the delta method.













on the hazard rate of moving among high school graduates in Moscow and St. Petersburg
as well as among those from rural areas. Again, we find evidence of a 3.5 percentage
point increase in the hazard of leaving the parental home among graduates in other major
metropolitan centres. We know, however, that this relationship is sensitive to the inclusion
of siblings fixed effects and group specific time trends.
As before, the greatest increase is found among graduates living in small cities and towns
and is estimated to be around 7 percentage points. Although these figures are smaller
than those in Table 1, they provide the same picture described earlier. By reducing the
frictions inherent in the college application process, the USE reform induces more high
school graduates from the periphery to increase their demand for post-secondary education,
and this in turn translates in greater mobility rates among periphery-resident graduates.
Repeating the same exercise using Cox proportional hazard models (reported in the Online
Appendix) leads exactly to the same conclusion.
B. Heterogeneous Effects
Next, we ask whether the 2009 reform had heterogenous effects on students’ mobility along
a number of observable characteristics. In particular, we investigate the possibility of
differential responses by gender, ethnicity, earlier household mobility status, household
income, and parental education. Because the lion’s share of the USE reform effect is
driven by high school graduates from small cities and towns, the estimates in Table 3 refer
exclusively to them. For completeness, however, we have performed the same analysis on
individuals from the other three locations in the sample and found no statistically significant
effect difference. For the sake of brevity, therefore, such results are not discussed here but
are available in the Online Appendix.
Table 3 shows that there is no response heterogeneity by gender and ethnicity, regardless
of whether we account for unobserved sibling fixed effects or not. This is interesting, for
the treatment group has larger fractions of women and ethnic Russians. We also do not
detect differential treatment effects in the top half of the household income distribution,
suggesting that the reform has equally affected students from the bottom half.













than small cities and towns (where they are observed at the time of the reform). Earlier
household mobility is thus inversely correlated with subsequent mobility away from the
family of origin, and essentially offsets the benchmark impact of being located in small
cities and towns. This differential impact weakens and becomes statistically insignificant
at conventional levels when we account for siblings fixed effects.43 The reform thus had a
stronger positive impact on the mobility rate of students who were born and bred in the
same small city or town.
Finally, having parents with university qualifications increases the probability that high
school graduates from small cities and towns leave their parental home by about 20 per-
centage points, while graduates whose parents are not college educated have a leaving-home
rates of 10 percentage points. The 10 point difference is statistically significant, but it is
not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. We interpret this difference as indicating a
non-negligible positive intergenerational correlation in university education, in line with
the findings reported in Borisov and Pissarides (2016). An implication of this result is that
it provides evidence that, within small cities and towns, the reform might have done little
to level the playing field for disadvantaged children in terms of improving their access to
higher education. As mentioned before, however, across the whole country the reform did
induce greater mobility among students from relatively poor backgrounds (living in small
cities and towns) as opposed to students from large metropolitan centers who are richer on
average.
4.4 Using High School Students in Moscow and St. Petersburg as Controls
An alternative to specification (1) is to restrict the analysis to students in the last year of
high school and estimate a model in which the control group is given by students who live
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, that is,
`it = ψ(t) + α̃I(t ≥ s) +
3∑
k=1
β̃kRik × I(t ≥ s) + X′itγ̃ + ηit, (2)
where the three indicator variables Rik (k=1,2,3) take, respectively, value 1 if student i lives
either in a major city (or regional capital) other than Moscow/St. Petersburg (N=407), a
43This may be because only one in four individuals in the sample had experienced earlier geographic













small city or town (N=408), or a rural area (N=575), and 0 otherwise, while the rest of
the notation is as in (1) with the dummy variables R being also included in X. We end
up having a sample of 1,547 high school students, of which 157 (10%) are in the control
group. The idea of this exercise is that students from Moscow and St. Petersburg may be
good comparators since their incentives to move out have not changed after the reform,
and focusing on people in their last year of high school is likely to reduce heterogeneity in
the decision of leaving the parental home.
The results in column (i) of Table 4 strongly support the baseline estimates of Table 1.
The reform led to an increase of 16 percentage points in the geographic mobility of students
from small cities and towns. We find an increase of nearly 6 percentage points also in the
case of high school graduates living in major cities (but this is significant only at the 10%
level), and again no effect for students in rural areas.
4.5 Mechanisms
Several mechanisms might be at work to set in place the effect of the USE reform on
geographic migration of high school graduates from small cities and towns. We investi-
gate the relevance of three channels, which are not mutually exclusive, namely, distance,
socioeconomic background, and knowledge.
The first channel is distance from the most prestigious higher education institutions,
which are located in Moscow and St. Petersburg (and, to a lesser extent, in some of the
major cities). Geographic distance can be seen as a proxy of the transportation costs faced
by students during the pre-reform application process (since they needed to move to those
cities to train for and take the admission exams) as well as during their studies (whenever
they travelled back home). From Appendix Table A.1 we know that transportation costs for
the average student have dramatically declined after the reform, mainly due to technological
improvements and favorable oil prices. If, in terms of the framework outlined in Section 3,
such costs make up an important fraction of the total cost k faced by all students, we expect
the function f to be affected. In other words, it could be the case that the heterogeneity of













costs. To assess the impact of distance, we then estimate the following variant of (2)
`it = ψ(t) + α̃I(t ≥ s) +
3∑
k=1




ϑkRik × I(t ≥ s)× distp + X′itγ̃ + ξit, (3)
in which distp is the distance to the nearest regional capital for students living in population
center p.44 On average, small cities and towns (k = 2) in our sample are 257 km away from
their correspondent regional capitals (median 180 km), while rural areas (k = 3) are 165 km
away (median 150 km). As in the case of equation (2), we estimate this new specification
on our sample of students in their last year of high school.
We begin with a simplified version, in which we set β̃2 = β̃3 = 0 and ϑ2 = ϑ3 = ϑ, so
we do not distinguish between small cities and towns and rural areas. The results are in
column (ii) of Table 4. They reveal that, once we control for location type, distance has no
independent impact on geographic mobility of high school graduates (the null that π = 0
cannot be rejected). But the effect of the USE reform in an area in the periphery that is 100
km away from a regional capital (ϑ) is estimated at 2 percentage points and is statistically
significant. Because high school graduates from the small cities and towns are on average
farther away from regional capitals than their counterparts located in rural areas, this result
raises the possibility that geographic distance may play a role in determining our results
across locations.
To further investigate this possibility, in column (iii) of Table 4, we present the estimates
from the full specification in (3). These suggest that the effect of the reform on small cities
and towns was strongly positive and significant regardless of distance to regional centers
(see β̃2). For rural areas, however, the results are more subtle. The direct effect (β̃3) is
negative but insignificant, while the triple interaction effect (ϑ3) is positive and significant
at the 10% level. Taken together, these estimates suggest a very small positive impact on
the likelihood of moving for students in rural locations that are at least 110 km away from
a regional capital. In sum, therefore, distance cannot account for the effect of the reform
in small cities and towns, and the fact that most high school students in rural areas are
close enough to regional capitals may partly explain why we do not find an effect in such














The second channel is socioeconomic background. Before the reform, parents without a
post-secondary education qualification may have perceived the college application system
as an ominous burden, which in and of itself could have made university access for their
children less likely. This problem might have been particularly acute in non-urban areas,
where a larger fraction of parents do not have a university degree. The results in Ta-
ble 3 confirm that socioeconomic background — proxied by both parents having university
qualifications — is a key mechanism for residents in small cities and towns. But, as doc-
umented in the Online Appendix, we find no evidence of the same effect among residents
of rural areas. Thus, socioeconomic background matters but only in the areas where the
pre-existing environment is conducive for the reform to be effective. This ties in nicely with
the evidence on the quality of secondary schools discussed in subsection 4.2.
The third mechanism is related to knowledge of the application process. There is no avail-
able data on what people know (or do not know) about the application procedures used
by universities to recruit students. An imperfect proxy is given by stated, self-reported
intentions to attend college among all secondary school students (see, among others, Dela-
vande and Zafar, 2014). The argument goes as follows. If the USE reform did change
opportunities in a way that students and their parents (and teachers) understand, this
change would be reflected also in students’ expectations about the likelihood of their col-
lege education. Thus, not only would the reform lead to greater mobility among high school
graduates from small cities and towns but it would also heighten their intention to attend
a university program while they are still in high school.
To assess this possibility we use data collected by the RLMS since 2006 on the intention
that young people have to enroll into a university program during the next three years.
High-school students aged 14–19 are in the treatment group, while the control group consists
of all other students aged 14–19, essentially attending technical and vocational secondary
institutions which do not provide qualifications based on the USE. About 65% of the 14–19
year old students in our new sample are in this control group. The outcome variable takes













years, and zero otherwise.45 With this new dependent variable, we then repeat the analysis
performed earlier stratified by location, with a set of specifications that allow for a flexible
common trend and others that allow for group specific trends.
Table 5 shows the relevant point estimates, along with their heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. The introduction of the reform did not change the intention to attend a
university program among students from all locations except those from small cities and
towns. Among them, the reform led to an increase in college attendance intentions by 21–24
percentage points if a common flexible trends is imposed and by 31 percentage points if we
allow for group-specific trends. These estimates imply a considerable increase of 40–60%
with respect to the average stated intentions of high-school students from small cities and
towns. Including sibling FE increases the standard errors and makes the impacts insignifi-
cant (columns (iii) and (vi)), but the FE point estimates are still sizable and comparable
to our previous results.
This evidence is consistent with the baseline findings based on actual choices. The USE
reform not only induced more students from the periphery to enroll into a college program
when they completed high school, but it also increased their expectations that they attend
university while still in high school. A substantial change in default rules, such as that
implied by the USE reform, might then lead to substantial changes in beliefs even though
the weight of history can shape individuals’ preferences rather deeply, as found in the case
of the former East Germany by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007).
5. Pre-college Mobility Among College Students and Graduates
So far we have focused on the mobility experienced by high school graduates out of their
family of origin. As shown in Figure 3, about 95% of the post-reform home-leaving rate
among high school graduates is attributable to individuals who move to enroll into a uni-
versity program. But we do not know if a similar outflow was already occurring before the
reform, although the reform did lead to a substantial step up in the probability of leaving
45The RLMS records the information into a binary (0/1) variable. Although this expectation is elicited
with a non-probabilistic method, rather than asking people to express probabilities directly, it is likely to
suffer less from the standard problem of variables constructed from Likert scales that make it difficult to
perform interpersonal comparisons, as different respondents may interpret the scales differently (McFadden














home. Thus, we now complement our earlier perspective and concentrate on the mobility
that university attendees and recent graduates experienced to enroll into college.
5.1 Data and Methods
Since 2009, RLMS respondents who attend, or have attended, a higher education institu-
tion are asked whether they changed their residence location for the purpose of starting
university studies. Since 2010, the questionnaire also includes specific questions about
the institution attended and its location. To limit issues of recall bias and diversity in
the reasons to attend college, we only select respondents who began a university program
on or after 2001 and who were between 15 and 22 years of age when they started their
post-secondary studies. We end up with a sample of 3,610 individuals.
In what follows we estimate DD models of the following form:
mit = ϕ(t) + ζDit + λDit × I(t ≥ 2009) + H′itρ+ νit, (4)
where mit is an indicator variable that takes value one if individual i lived somewhere other
than the university’s location prior to starting college at time t. The variable I(·) is a
dummy that switches on if college attendance starts in 2009 or after, i.e., after the full
implementation of the USE reform, while Dit is equal to 1 if i started college when he/she
was 15–18 years old and 0 if he/she started at 19–22. Defining the treatment group in this
way allows us to compare the average mobility rate of high school graduates who enroll
into a university program immediately after completion of secondary school to the mobility
rate of older individuals who are highly unlikely to have been admitted to college based
on their USE exam results (see Section 2). λ is the parameter that denotes the treatment
effect.
The vector Hit includes personal demographic factors, such as sex, ethnicity, place of
residence, and parental education. Importantly, the data also allow us to include a rich
set of characteristics of the individual’s higher education experience, such as field of study,
college location, and university ranking. We include such variables as they allow us to check
whether the reform achieved its stated objective of facilitating access to scientific programs
in elite universities. When we exclude them from (4), since they could be seen as outcomes













captures time trends which, as in (1), are modeled either with a fully flexible set of time
dummies that are common to treatment and control groups or with group-specific linear
processes.
We estimate (4) using difference-in-difference (DD) and two-step Blundell-Costa Dias
propensity-score matching (PSM) regressions. Because of the information used to construct
our dependent variable and our estimating sample, sibling FE models cannot be identified
in this case, as we have only one observation per individual.
Appendix Table A.2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables in H by group,
both before and after the reform as well as the p-value of the balance test in the reform-
off period. Individuals in both treatment and control groups are similar along a number
of personal characteristics, such as sex, ethnicity, and previous geographic mobility. But
there are a few pre-reform differences. For instance, university attendees and graduates
have more educated parents (especially fathers), which confirms there is a great deal of in-
tergenerational correlation in university education. They are also more likely to come from
major cities, in particular from Moscow and St. Petersburg, where their post-secondary
education programs are typically located.
5.2 Main Results
Table 6 reports the treatment effect estimates, λ, with their robust standard errors clustered
at the population center level.46 After the introduction of the USE reform, a simple DD
comparison (without including time trend controls or other variables) implies that college
students are 11.5 percentage points more likely to have come from a location other than
the city where their university is based (column (i)). Allowing for a flexible time trend
and including covariates reduces the effect to about 8.1 percentage points (column (ii)).
The estimate in column (iii) is obtained by replacing the year dummies with group-specific
linear time trends. This increases the effect to 11.4 percentage points. The PSM estimate
with common time dummies and a 0.01 bandwidth for matching is just below 11 percentage
points (column (iv)), and this is robust across different bandwidths ranging from 0.005 to
0.05.













In line with what we documented in the previous section, the USE reform has then
induced heightened mobility among those who enrolled into a university program. We
next explore if this is associated with specific characteristics of college attendees or the
universities themselves.
5.3 Heterogeneity
Individual Attributes — We consider three individual specific domains in which the effect
of the reform could differ, i.e., sex, ethnic origin, and parental education (distinguishing
maternal from paternal education). Each panel of Table 7 presents the results, showing in
each case the estimated value of λ as well as the coefficient on the interaction between the
attribute of interest and Dit×I(t ≥ 2009) obtained from the DD model (4) with a common
flexible time trend. The level estimates with group-specific trends and the PSM estimates
are very close to those shown here, and are thus not presented.
Men and individuals of non-Russian ethnic origins display a greater propensity of moving
to start college studies than women and Russians respectively (see panels A and B). But
only the latter of such differences is (marginally) statistically significant. The next two
panels show that mobility also does not differ by parental education.
University Characteristics — Given the goal of the reform to democratize access to post-
graduate studies and in particular to scientific programs in top institutions located in
Moscow and St. Petersburg, we look at the possibility of different responses by field of
study, college location, and university ranking.
We find that the effect on mobility among individuals who attended programs in univer-
sities located in Moscow and St. Petersburg (panel E) is 5 percentage points (53%) greater
than the baseline estimates in column (ii) of Table 6. The estimated differential mobility
to all other major and smaller cities instead is lower but such responses are not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. The estimates in panel F indicate that the effect is
substantially higher among students who enrolled into science majors: they experienced a
two- to three-fold increase in the likelihood of having moved to be in college. Individuals in
business, law, economics, and engineering do not show any change in mobility rates, while













mobility. Indeed, the USE reform was not introduced with an aim to facilitate participation
to such (highly popular but less academic) programs.
Finally, the results in panel G show that mobility to the top 30 institutions in the country
has not increased more than in others as a result of the reform. This finding is robust even
if we change our focus to the top 10, the top 50, or the top 10–50 institutions, thus leaving
out the most prestigious programs.
In sum, we strengthen our findings from the previous section that the USE reform induced
more high school graduates to leave their parental home and enroll into university programs.
This heightened mobility has happened equally among men and women and among students
with different socioeconomic background, levelling the playing field between the sexes and
different socioeconomic groups. In line with the reformers’ stated intentions, we also observe
more mobility to universities located in Moscow and St. Petersburg and to attend science
programs, although not necessarily in the top institutions.
6. Other Outcomes
Having established that the USE reform has induced a substantial mobility of high school
graduates out of their parental home, especially in small cities and towns where the demand
for post-secondary education cannot be satisfied locally, and into university programs in
Moscow and St. Petersburg, we ask whether the reform has led to other (perhaps uninten-
tional) responses.
For this purpose we analyze a wide range of outcomes, i.e., monetary transfers from
parents to nonresident children, household expenditures and their composition, parents’
labor supply, and divorce, and spillover effects affecting high school graduates who do not
leave. Most of this analysis is performed at the household level, except that referring to
parental labor supply and spillover effects, and uses the following DD approach:47
yjt = τ(t) + ξdjt + φdjtI(t ≥ s) + Q′jtδ + ujt, (5)
where τ(t) is the time trend measured in the same two ways as we have done previously,
and djt is equal to 1 if household j at time t has at least one child in the last year of high
47See the Online Appendix for details on how we link households across RLMS rounds and summary













school, and is equal to 0 for households that have at least one child but not in the last year
of high school. We use a wide range of characteristics of the treated/comparison child to
define the variables included in Q, and find evidence of strong comparability on observables
between the two groups.
We focus on the effects observed among households located in small cities and towns. For
families in all other locations we do not detect any significant effect (see the supplementary
material in the Online Appendix). This is not surprising since in locations other than small
cities and towns we also find no USE impact on high school graduates’ mobility, which is
the most obvious candidate outcome to be affected by the 2009 reform.48
6.1 Parental Transfers
If the leaving-home decision of high school graduates is followed by college attendance
(and this implies a physical relocation in a different city center), then arguably migrant
students remain financially dependent on their parents to a greater extent than if they
left to start a job. We thus analyze the probability that parents make a money transfer
to nonresident children and estimate equation (5), in which the dependent variable takes
value 1 if household j observed at time t makes a monetary transfer to an absent child in
any of the following two years, t+ 1 or t+ 2, and 0 if no transfer occurs.49
Panel A of Table 8 reports the regression results by specification of τ(t), i.e., with a fully
flexible time trend that is common to treatment and control groups (column (i)) and with
group specific linear trends (column (ii)). The estimate in columns (i) indicates that high
school students from small cities and towns who leave the parental home after graduation
are 15 percentage points more likely to receive financial transfers from their parents over the
two years after leaving as a result of the USE reform. This is a large impact, corresponding
48At present there is no (individual or aggregate) information on universities attended in Russia, apart
from what we analyzed in the previous section. Also, information on USE test results is not collected
by the RLMS or other statistical agencies, and universities do not release data on their students and
applicants. Thus, we cannot assess whether the composition of students changed, nor can we test if the
cohorts admitted to university after the introduction of the reform were more (or less) geographically
dispersed.
49We also redefined the outcome, from the viewpoint of the child, as receiving a transfer within one
year, and found similar results to those shown below. In addition, we estimated the effect on transfer
levels conditional on observing a positive transfer. These effect estimates are never statistically significant,
possibly reflecting problems of measurement error as well as selection issues, given that only 15% of













to a 50% increase at the mean transfer probability. The estimate in columns (ii) is even
larger, with the probability that parents make a transfer to their nonresident children going
up to 23 percentage points, a staggering 77% increase.
These results confirm that, after the implementation of the USE reform, high school
graduates in small cities and towns do leave their family of origin to continue their studies
in post-secondary education institutions. This decision, which requires a costly relocation
away from home, is accompanied by higher financial transfers from parents to children.
6.2 Household Expenditures
Changes in the pattern of parental transfers to children may affect other aspects of family
behavior related to the allocation of financial resources within households. One of such
aspects are household savings. When we examined this outcome, no effect of the USE
reform was found (see the Online Appendix). This could be attributed to the relatively
coarse information on savings made available in the RLMS and to the fact that only 27%
percent of Russian households report to have positive savings in the pre-reform period.
Another important aspect of family resources is given by household expenditures. The
RLMS collects detailed data on expenditures on food and other nondurables, clothes, and
durables. We first aggregated all items and analyzed the impact of the reform on total
household expenditure levels. We detected no effect (see the estimates in the Online Ap-
pendix). This may not be surprising given there might be issues of measurement error
and aggregation. We then analyzed household shares in finer expenditure aggregates, such
as durables, food, and other nondurables. Again, we found no effect induced by the USE
reform.
The only exception to this result emerges in the case of household expenditures on edu-
cation. The estimates in panel B of Table 8 show the USE reform effect on the share of
educational expenditures in the total nondurable household expenditures. From the esti-
mate in column (i) in which we impose a fully flexible common trend, we find that the
reform led to an average increase of about 2.2 percentage points in the share of educational
expenditures. This is a considerable impact, representing a 70% increase with respect to the













of group specific trends reported in column (ii).
Despite the lack of statistical significance in this last case, such estimates and those in the
previous subsection help us clarify the picture. Not only are families located in small cities
and towns more likely to see their children leave after high school graduation as a result
of the 2009 reform. They are also more likely to make financial transfers to their children
and divert some of their resources to educational expenditures after graduation. All these
pieces of evidence point to the USE reform as a catalyst of change within households,
triggering greater geographic mobility among high-school graduates from the periphery to
post-secondary education institutions mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and inducing
more parental investments in, and transfers to, migrant children.
6.3 Parental Labor Supply
Larger monetary transfers to children and higher household educational expenditures could
require a greater labor market involvement of parents who plan to support their children
after high school graduation and into their university careers.
Father’s labor supply is generally believed to be inelastic, although a few recent studies
have found nonnegligible elasticity values (see the review in Keane, 2011). Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the results in panel C of Table 8 show that father’s monthly hours of work did
not change with the introduction of the reform. Allowing for group-specific trends leads to
larger positive effect estimates, corresponding to an increase of about 15% over the monthly
mean hours (columns (ii)). But none of these estimates is statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero. The impact on paternal labor force participation is also small and never
statistically significant (panel D).
Female (and maternal) labor supply elasticities, especially on the participation margin,
are typically large (Keane, 2011). One therefore might expect to observe some change in
mothers’ labor market behavior. Instead, the estimates in panels E and F of Table 8 reveal
essentially no change in hours worked and in labor force participation among mothers in
small Russian cities and towns. This zero-effect result could reflect modest or insufficient
labor market opportunities in the local economy in the post-reform years, although local













preted as offering evidence that the USE reform did not create unanticipated labor market
responses among parents of treated individuals.
6.4 Parental Divorce
Another dimension of family life that the reform could have unintentionally affected is fam-
ily stability. Some parents, especially those in poorer households or with lower educational
attainment, may find it difficult to face (or hard to justify) greater expenditures to sup-
port the schooling investment of their children. From our earlier analysis, we do not find
any negative impact of the USE on family spending, other than educational expenditures.
However, if these allocations are not agreed upon by both parents or if they are perceived
as crowding out future spending, intra-family trust may be progressively eroded, and this
in turn may strain family relations and lead to greater chances of union dissolution.50 To
assess whether this is the case or not, we examine the probability that parents separate
from one interview to the next and re-estimate equation (5) in which the dependent variable
is equal to 1 if either of the parents leaves the household between two successive RLMS
rounds, and 0 otherwise. The effect estimates are in panel G of Table 8. Irrespective of the
way in which time trends are modeled, the estimates show that the USE reform did not
significantly affect family stability.
6.5 Spillover Effects Among Stayers
Besides the families of high school graduates who left their parental home, the 2009 reform
might have also affected high school graduates who decided not to move, at least not
immediately after graduation. (We label such graduates as ’stayers’.)51 To ascertain this
potential impact, we estimate multinomial logit regressions using the sample of stayers
50In many respects this can be seen as a ‘surprise’ in the sense used by Weiss and Willis (1993), although in
their application, surprises consist of changes in the predicted earnings capacity of either spouse. Mencarini,
Moroni, and Pronzato (2012) provide evidence of effects that go in the opposite direction, that is, from
parental separation to the decision of children to leave home. In particular, they find that children who
have experienced a parental separation — and co-residing with their mothers — tend to leave home earlier,
but that the last child in the household, who would leave the mother alone if leaving, tends to delay his/her
departure. It should be noted that, differently from such a result, the estimates in the Online Appendix
reveal that coming from an intact family leads to a greater likelihood of leaving the parental home. In our
analysis, however, we do not isolate the effect for the last child in the household from that of other siblings.
51As discussed in subsection 4.3 we find no evidence based on observables that, as the USE reform














in small cities and towns who keep co-residing with their parents after completing their
secondary education. The outcome is a three-level categorical variable: the first level
includes any sort of paid labor market involvement, the second refers to studying (in local,
further education institutions), and the third is a residual category that comprises unpaid
activities and, primarily, inactivity.
Panel H of Table 8 reports the results that show marginal probability changes for work
and study with respect to the base category. Regardless of how time trends are specified,
we find a small increase in the probability of working (around 3.5 percentage points) and a
decrease in the probability of continuing study in further education (around 6.5 percentage
points). Both sets of impacts are statistically insignificant. The reduction in the likelihood
of studying (albeit insignificant) should be interpreted in the context of the lack of post-
secondary educational provision in the periphery: if people in small cities and towns intend
to continue studying after high school completion, they ought to do so by moving to larger
cities.
It appears, therefore, that the reform did not generate negative spillover effects on the
activities performed by young adults who stayed with their parents in small cities and towns.
Of course, there might be other (longer term) equilibrium effects on the subpopulation of
stayers that we cannot consider here (e.g., fertility, health, and crime). These are important,
policy-relevant areas, which are left for future research.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides the first evidence of the effect of the 2009 reform that required all
universities in Russia to determine their admission decisions on the basis of the results from
the national high-school test, known as Unified State Exam. The USE-based admission
criterion does not impose costs to college applicants other than those related to taking
the USE test itself. The pre-reform rules often required applicants to sit in expensive
preparatory courses and incur the cost of travelling to examination venues, which would
have been prohibitively high for most applicants located in remote areas far from major
city centres, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where most of the elite institutions were













Our baseline estimates indicate that the reform induced a substantially greater leaving
home rate of 12–16 percentage points (a threefold increase, at least) among high school
graduates living in small cities and towns. These are exactly the places most likely to be
characterized by a pent-up demand for college enrollment, since small Russian cities and
towns do not have major universities and their secondary schools are generally of high
quality. Two important channels seem to have played a role. One is parents’ socioeco-
nomic background, according to which having parents with university qualifications is a
key predictor of mobility. The other is information, whereby high school students from
small cities and towns were the only ones who, after the introduction of the USE reform,
showed a greater intention to attend university. The reform therefore might have changed
their expectations.
These results are robust to different definitions of the control group and different speci-
fications of temporal trends (i.e., imposing highly flexible common trends or allowing for
group specific linear trends), as well as the inclusion of a wide set of observable confounders
and unobserved fixed effects that are shared among siblings. The same findings also emerge
when we combine difference-in-differences with a two-step propensity score matching pro-
cedure, which pairs treated individuals with a subset of nontreated individuals who are
closest to them in terms of observable characteristics, and when we estimate discrete time
duration models and Cox proportional hazard models of leaving the parental home. Fi-
nally, the same results are confirmed with a subsample of young adults who are currently
enrolled in university programs or have recently received a college degree.
Families located in small cities and towns are also more likely to make financial transfers
to their children after graduation and use their resources to increase the share of educa-
tional expenditures as a result of the 2009 reform. These results are likely to reflect greater
child investments among families whose children are in completion of their secondary school
studies and start higher education. We also find no evidence of unintended or detrimen-
tal consequences of the reform on a wide range of family behaviors, such as all items of
expenditures other than education, paternal and maternal labor supply (along both the
extensive and intensive margins), and parental separation. Similarly, we find no evidence













domains suggests that the USE reform did not induce changes in parental behavior other
than in aspects that are educationally salient to children at the end of high school and in
the early years of college.
Our results can be explained by the substantial abatement in college application costs
that the USE reform implied. Pre-reform application procedures imposed frictions that
constrained high school graduates located in peripheral areas from optimally investing
in their human capital. Their reduction induced a greater fraction of students from the
periphery to apply to, and attend, university programs. As the average high school graduate
from small cities and towns is substantially poorer than the average student from major
urban centers, the USE reform seems to have gone some way in facilitating the transition to
college among low-income students, and democratizing access and widening participation
to higher education.
Future work can build on our results and assess whether the USE reform affects later
child outcomes (such as university graduation and scores, labor market participation, oc-
cupational choice, and wages among students who moved), or if it leads to undesirable
spillover effects, other than those we tested. The analysis of possible changes in the sec-
ondary school sector, such as those documented by Cullen, Long, and Reback (2013) and
Estevan et al. (2018) for Texas, seems another important avenue of research. Whether
the USE-induced, more egalitarian access to higher education will have a lasting legacy
affecting social mobility, family life, political democratization, and human rights across all
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Figure 1 – The Decision to Apply to an Elite College
Note: The term a on the horizontal axis denotes ability. The functions













Figure 2 – The Decision to Apply and Migrate to an Elite College in the Presence of the USE
Reform
(a) Case with Mobility
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of children who leave their parental
home to another dwelling within one year of interview. ‘Treatment’ refers
to students in the last year of high school, while ‘Control’ refers to young
people aged 15–19 who are not in the last year of high school. For each
of the treatment and control groups, the “S” series (dashed lines) refer
to the fraction of individuals who leave their parental home to another
dwelling with the purpose of starting a new program of study (only avail-
able from the 2008 RLMS wave onwards). The vertical line indicates the













Table 1 – Effect of the USE Reform on Student Mobility
Flexible Common Trend Group-specific Linear Trend PSM
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Full Sample
β 0.041** 0.037** 0.042** 0.038 0.035 0.022 0.040**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.027) (0.033) (0.018)
N 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,710 13,709
Moscow & St. Petersburg
β -0.014 -0.020 -0.009 0.071 0.069 0.059 -0.005
(0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.022)
N 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,369
Other Major Cities
β 0.057** 0.049** 0.039 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.049**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.023)
N 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,013
Small Cities and Towns
β 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.128*** 0.163*** 0.157*** 0.159** 0.132***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.053) (0.056) (0.065) (0.041)
N 3,801 3,801 3,801 3,801 3,801 3,801 3,776
Rural Areas
β -0.002 -0.008 0.012 -0.042 -0.040 -0.070 -0.032
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.037)
N 4,521 4,521 4,521 4,521 4,521 4,521 4,504
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: Columns (i) through (vi) report the estimate of β obtained from linear probability models
(equation (1)). The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the child leaves their parental
home to another dwelling within one year of interview and 0 if the child stays in the household.
The treatment group consists of students in the last year of high school. The control group
consists of individuals aged 15–19 who are not in the last year of high school. Robust standard
errors clustered at population center level are in parenthesis. Models differ on the type of time
trend (wave dummies in columns (i)–(iii) and group-specific linear trends in columns (iv)–(vi)),
the presence of control variables, and whether sibling fixed effects are included. N is the number
of person-wave observations. For sibling FE models, there are 3,439 households in the whole
sample. The estimates on other explanatory variables included in each regression are reported
in the Online Appendix. Column (vii) presents PSM-based estimates that are obtained from a
two-step procedure.













Table 2 – Sensitivity Checks
Alternative
Control Group
Falsification Test Duration Model
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Moscow and -0.008 0.037 -0.012 -0.032 -0.002 -0.017
St. Petersburg (0.038) (0.117) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.025)
N 517 517 930 930 1,143 1,124
Other Major 0.058** 0.063 0.004 -0.008 0.038** 0.036**
Cities (0.024) (0.053) (0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.015)
N 1,504 1,504 2,616 2,616 4,767 4,727
Small Cities 0.102** 0.104 -0.058 -0.043 0.072** 0.070**
and Towns (0.049) (0.095) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
N 1,690 1,690 2,474 2,474 4,361 4,343
Rural Areas -0.027 -0.068 0.019 0.059 -0.013 -0.021
(0.030) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.026) (0.026)
N 1,672 1,672 2,781 2,781 5,050 5,037
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Sibling FE No Yes No Yes No No
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the child leaves their parental
home to another dwelling within one year of interview and 0 if the child stays in the
household. Columns (i) and (ii) report estimates when the control group is restricted to
vocational and technical school students. Columns (iii) and (iv) report estimates of the
effect of a “placebo reform” imposed to occur in 2002 (sample restricted to the period
1994–2007). Columns (v) and (vi) report the marginal effect obtained from a (logit)
discrete time duration model. The corresponding standard errors, clustered at the
population center level and obtained via delta method, are reported in parentheses. N
is the number of person-wave observations. The control variables are listed in Table A.1.













TTable 3 – Heterogeneous Effects among Individuals from Small Cities and TownsLevel FE
Female -0.032 -0.035
(0.072) (0.082)
Russian ethnicity 0.050 0.049
(0.096) (0.103)
Born Elsewherea -0.188*** -0.115
(0.060) (0.083)
In the top half of the -0.040 -0.070
income distribution (0.083) (0.093)
Both parents have 0.203** 0.225
university degrees (0.094) (0.151)
N 3,801 3,801
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the child leaves
their parental home to another dwelling within one year of interview and
0 if the child stays in the household. The estimates are obtained from
linear probability models in which time dummies and all the controls listed
in Table A.1 are included besides the interactions between the indicator
variables d, I(t ≥ s), d × I(t ≥ s), and the variable of interest. The
table shows the estimate on d × I(t ≥ s) interacted with the variable of
interest. Robust standard errors clustered at population center level are in
parenthesis. N is the number of person-wave observations.
a ‘Elsewhere’ means in a different population center.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and













Table 4 – Mobility of Students in Their Last Year of High-school
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (3)
Restricted Full
(i) (ii) (iii)
Regional Centers (β̃1) 0.056* 0.034 0.057*
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Small Cities & Towns (β̃2) 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.049) (0.058)
Rural Areas (β̃3) 0.006 -0.038
(0.036) (0.041)
Effect of Distance:
Baseline (π) 0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Common Effect (ϑ) 0.020**
(0.008)
Small Cities and Towns (ϑ2) -0.000
(0.011)
Rural Areas (ϑ3) 0.036*
(0.021)
N 1,547 1,547 1,547
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the child leaves
their parental home to another dwelling within one year of interview and
0 if the child stays in the household. The sample is restricted to students
in their last year of high-school. N is the number of observations. Stu-
dents residing in Moscow and St. Petersburg are the control group. Other
locations are considered treated. The estimates are obtained from linear
probability models. Robust standard errors clustered at population center
level are in parenthesis. All specifications include wave dummies and the
control variables listed in Table A.1.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and













Table 5 – College Attendance Intentions
Flexible Common Trend Group-Specific Time Trend
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Moscow and -0.080 -0.136 0.148 0.071 0.017 0.280
St. Petersburg (0.182) (0.187) (0.612) (0.305) (0.308) (0.720)
N 276 276 276 276 276 276
Other Major -0.023 -0.056 -0.029 -0.048 -0.065 -0.217
Cities (0.083) (0.076) (0.178) (0.129) (0.121) (0.198)
N 903 903 903 903 903 903
Small Cities 0.236** 0.214* 0.225 0.308** 0.314** 0.190
and Towns (0.105) (0.112) (0.164) (0.126) (0.136) (0.235)
N 863 863 863 863 863 863
Rural Areas -0.013 0.052 -0.033 -0.008 0.024 -0.097
(0.063) (0.067) (0.115) (0.093) (0.089) (0.174)
N 968 968 968 968 968 968
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sibling FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the student expects
to attend university (available for RLMS rounds 2006–2014). All high-school
students are considered treated. Full-time students 14-19 not in high-school or
university are used as control group. Estimates are obtained from linear prob-
ability models. Robust standard errors clustered at population center level are
in parentheses. N is the number of person-wave observations. All specifications
include wave dummies. The control variables are listed in Table A.1.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level.
Table 6 – Mobility Prior to College





(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
λ 0.115*** 0.081*** 0.114** 0.109**
(0.037) (0.029) (0.051) (0.033)
N 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,595
Note: Estimates of λ (see equation (4)). The dependent variable is an indicator equal to
1 if the individual changed their residence location for the purpose of starting university
studies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N is the number of individuals.
Column (i) shows the estimate without time trends and without control variables.
Columns (ii) and (iii) include, respectively, a flexible common time trend and group-
specific linear time trends, as well as the controls for individual and higher education
program characteristics listed in Table A.2. The estimate in column (iv) is obtained
applying PSM on these same characteristics. The estimates on other explanatory
variables included in each regression are reported in the Online Appendix.













Table 7 – Heterogeneous Effects on Mobility Prior to College
A. Gender










λ (base = No higher education) 0.077**
(0.030)
Mother has university degree or more 0.094
(0.138)
D. Father’s Education
λ (base = No higher education) 0.082***
(0.030)
Father has university degree or more 0.012
(0.166)
E. University Location
λ (base = Moscow & St Petersburg) 0.131**
(0.055)
Other major cities -0.062
(0.071)
Small cities and towns -0.076
(0.076)
F. Field of Study
λ (base = Natural and social sciences) 0.165***
(0.062)







λ (base = 31+) 0.079***
(0.030)
In top 30 0.049
(0.091)
Note: Estimates of heterogeneous effects are based on regressions similar to
equation (4), in which a relevant characteristic is interacted with Dit, I(t ≥
2009), and Dit× I(t ≥ 2009). The dependent variable is an indicator equal
to 1 if the individual changed their residence location for the purpose of
starting university studies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All
regressions include a fully flexible common time trend, as well as the control
variables listed in Table A.2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The number of observations (individuals) is 3,610 (except for panel F, where
we restrict to 3,430 observations with non-missing field of study).
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and













Table 8 – Other Outcomes (Small Cities and Towns)
Flexible Common Trend Group-Specific Time Trends
(i) (ii)










































Flexible Common Trend Group-Specific Time Trends
(i) (ii)
H. Spillover effects [mean of “work” = 0.371; mean of “study” = 0.512]f
φ (Work) 0.036 0.035
(0.047) (0.071)
φ (Study) -0.067 -0.065
(0.057) (0.083)
N 3,364 3,364
Note: In panels A through G, β is the treatment effect estimate obtained from
regressions that include all the the control variables listed in Table A.1. Robust
standard errors clustered at population center level are in parenthesis. N is the
number of household-wave observations in panels A, B, and G, and the number
of person-wave observations in panels C–F and H, respectively.
a ‘Monetary transfers to children’ takes value 1 if the household makes a transfer
to a child outside the household in any of the two RLMS waves following the
child’s move out of the household, and 0 otherwise.
b Share of household expenditures in education over the total household non-
durable consumption. The regressions also control for the log of total nondurable
expenditures.
c Measured as actual total hours worked in all jobs during the month before
interview.
d Equals 1 if in work, and 0 otherwise.
e Equals 1 if one of the two parents leaves the household within one year of the
interview at time t in households in which both parents are present at t, and 0
otherwise.
f Each figure is the estimated treatment effect of the USE reform obtained from
multinomial logit models that include all the the control variables listed in Ta-
ble A.1. The base category is inactivity. The household sample is restricted to
individuals who co-reside with their parents in the following survey round. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the population center level and
derived via the delta method.





















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Migration of 16-19 year olds as % of University Enrollment
Note: The figure presents the ratio of internal student migration
relative to university enrolment. Migration figures come from ad-
ministrative records for fifteen large Russian cities compiled by the
Federal Migration Service. Enrolment figures correspond to the first
year cohort in all universities in the administrative area (including
Master’s level programs). They come from the Ministry of Education













Table A.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Home Leaving Mobility
Control Group Treatment Group Balancing Test
Reform off Reform on Reform off Reform on p-value
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.469 0.479 0.558 0.562 0.000
Age (years) 17.26 17.36 16.7 17.2 0.000
Russian ethnicity 0.612 0.487 0.570 0.470 0.004
Born elsewherea 0.233 0.207 0.256 0.201 0.167
Household Demographics
Household Size 4.00 3.96 4.02 3.99 0.619
No. siblings, 0–6 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.979
No. siblings, 7–14 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.062
No. siblings, 15–19 0.27 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.019
No. siblings, 20–24 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.445
No. siblings, 25+ 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.415
Other children, 15–19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.469
Mother in household 0.949 0.940 0.968 0.949 0.008
(=1, if yes)
Father in household 0.746 0.718 0.799 0.754 0.000
(=1, if yes)
Both parents in household 0.734 0.705 0.793 0.742 0.000
(=1, if yes)
No. grandparents in household 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.29 0.509
Socioeconomic Status
Mother has a university 0.175 0.239 0.216 0.310 0.004
degree (=1, if yes)
Father has a university 0.127 0.137 0.173 0.176 0.001
degree (=1, if yes)
Both parents have 0.066 0.081 0.089 0.113 0.012
university degrees (=1, if yes)
Home owners (=1, if yes) 0.911 0.909 0.899 0.920 0.299
Own a dacha (=1, if yes) 0.218 0.194 0.208 0.216 0.749
Own an extra apartment 0.064 0.101 0.061 0.109 0.439
(=1, if yes)
Own a car (=1, if yes) 0.357 0.501 0.429 0.536 0.000
Median Income Rankb 0.490 0.471 0.503 0.492 0.168
Location
Moscowc 0.083 0.076 0.076 0.088 0.434
St. Petersburgc 0.038 0.027 0.030 0.024 0.380
Other major citiesd 0.304 0.296 0.280 0.272 0.025
Small cities and townsd 0.279 0.267 0.267 0.254 0.454
Rural areasd 0.296 0.334 0.347 0.363 0.000
Federation Districts
North and North Western 0.107 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.372
Central and Chyornyzyomla 0.228 0.237 0.200 0.265 0.054
Volga 0.165 0.168 0.200 0.174 0.007
North Caucasus 0.140 0.184 0.154 0.180 0.263
Ural 0.170 0.143 0.135 0.118 0.002
Western Siberia 0.093 0.083 0.102 0.093 0.354
East Siberia 0.098 0.093 0.119 0.072 0.354
Local Conditions
Travel cost to Moscowe 16.7 3.6 21.7 3.4 0.116
Travel cost to state capitale 1.8 0.4 1.7 0.4 0.793
Youth unemployment ratef 0.169 0.133 0.176 0.135 0.012
N 8,571 5,574 1,054 788
Note: Figures are means by group (treatment and control) and period (reform-off = 1994–2007, reform-on = 2008–
2014). The treatment group consists of students in the last year of high school. The control group consists of
individuals aged 15–19 who are not in the last year of high school. The balancing test is a two-tail test of the equality
of means across groups in the reform-off period.
aElsewhere means in a different population center.
bRefers to the median of the cross-sectional income rank taken over all the waves in which each household is observed.
Notice in all the regressions we include indicators for income rank quartiles.
cIncludes the whole metropolitan area within a 50 Km radius.
dIncludes all the area within a 20 Km radius from the main center.
eRefers to the mean cost to travel to Moscow or the State (Oblast) capital, expressed in thousands of 2013 rubles.













Table A.2 – Descriptive Statistics for College Attendants and Recent Graduates
Control Group Treatment Group Balancing Test
Reform off Reform on Reform off Reform on p-value
Place of Residence
Moscow & St. Petersburg 0.193 0.155 0.152 0.129 0.013
Other Major Cities 0.369 0.425 0.467 0.450 0.000
Small Cities and Towns 0.277 0.240 0.235 0.199 0.034
Rural Areas 0.161 0.180 0.146 0.222 0.342
North & North Western 0.070 0.053 0.042 0.049 0.010
Central & Chyornyzyomla 0.154 0.183 0.210 0.219 0.001
Volga 0.120 0.148 0.157 0.157 0.013
North Caucasus 0.115 0.121 0.144 0.117 0.053
Ural 0.172 0.132 0.114 0.108 0.000
Western Siberia 0.096 0.091 0.090 0.079 0.662
East Siberia 0.076 0.114 0.090 0.141 0.282
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.592 0.580 0.611 0.632 0.393
Russian ethnicity 0.872 0.824 0.854 0.819 0.225
Born elsewhere 0.367 0.352 0.400 0.368 0.132
Mother has univ. degree 0.056 0.053 0.075 0.047 0.067
Father has univ. degree 0.035 0.027 0.065 0.038 0.001
Field of Study
Natural Sciences 0.078 0.089 0.121 0.177 0.004
Business, Law & Economics 0.477 0.482 0.400 0.393 0.001
Social Sciences & Humanities 0.090 0.126 0.128 0.138 0.006
Education 0.089 0.073 0.080 0.068 0.461
Engineering 0.193 0.219 0.205 0.205 0.528
Missing Field 0.072 0.011 0.066 0.019 0.121
University Location
Moscow & St. Petersburg 0.243 0.228 0.203 0.211 0.025
Other Major Cities 0.403 0.452 0.416 0.432 0.567
Small Cities 0.353 0.320 0.381 0.357 0.193
Rental Index (Moscow=100) 38.816 41.196 37.522 37.866 0.397
Missing Rental Index 0.305 0.247 0.302 0.301 0.885
University Ranked Top 50 0.088 0.116 0.102 0.140 0.268
Observations 719 438 1618 835
Note: Figures are means by group (treatment and control) and period (based on starting year in college, i.e., reform-
off = 2001–2008, reform-on = 2009–2015). The balancing test is a two-tail test of the equality of means across groups
in the reform-off period.
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